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AMENDED RULE 23: A DEFENDANT'S POINT
OF VIEW
THOMAS J. WEITHERS*
The Advisory Note to amended Rule 23 indicates that the
primary purpose of the class action device is the conservation
of time, effort and expense by consolidation of multiple law
suits into one action. A second avowed purpose is the pro-
vision of a forum for small claimants unable to afford sep-
arate litigation. However, these two objectives are potentially
conflicting. The availability of a forum to numerous small
claimants who would not otherwise have asserted their griev-
ances invites the expenditure of considerable time, effort and
money. Mr. Weithers notes the tendency of the courts of
appeal to favor the open-forum purpose of the Rule, and
argues for a more balanced accommodation of policies com-
mitted to the discretion of the trial courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1966, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
was completely rewritten in order to alleviate the many interpretive
problems inherent in the former Rule 23. Although the amended Rule
is certainly a substantial improvement over its predecessor,' the lan-
guage used is new and thus has been the subject of varying interpreta-
tion. Essential to a comprehensive analysis of these questions of
construction is a knowledge of the overriding purposes of the class
action in general. One must not attempt to decipher the interpreta-
tional issues in a vacuum but must rather view them in the light of the
overall motives and purposes of Rule 23 itself. It is the purpose of this
article to discuss several of these essential purposes in order to lay the
proper guidelines for an intelligent appreciation of the fundamentals
of amended Rule 23.
Basically, the amended Rule permits class actions in three situa-
tions. Paragraph (b) (1) permits a class action if the prosecution of
* A.B,, University of Notre Dame, 1950; J. D., DePaul University, 1953; Member,
Chicago, Illinois and American Bar Associations; Society of Trial Lawyers of Illinois;
Appellate Lawyers Society of Illinois (Director) ; Member, The Federation of Insurance
Counsel; Partner in the firm of Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller,
Chicago, Illinois.
1
 Indeed, the former Rule 23 was the subject of extensive criticism. See, e.g., Z.
Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 200 (1950) ; Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1941) ; Keeffe, Levy & Donovan,
Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Cornell L.Q. 327 (1948) ; Note, Federal Class Actions: A
Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 818 (1946). But cf. Simeon, Proce-
dural Problems of Class Suits, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 905, 953 (1962) ; VanDercreek, The "Is"
and "Ought" of Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 273, 283 (1963).
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separate actions (1) could force the party opposing the class into sev-
eral incompatible positions or (2) if litigation by one member of a
group would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members of the group who are not parties to the action.= It
should be noted that both of the (b) (1) situations providing for class
action treatment assume either the commencement of numerous law-
suits, or the imminence of such an assault.
Paragraph (b) (2) permits a class action where "the party oppos-
ing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applica-
ble to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.'
Typical of class actions of this type are actions in the civil rights area
where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a
class."
To appreciate the utility and propriety of the class action device
in the (b) (1) and (b) (2) situations, one may visualize the difficulties
likely to arise from resort to separate actions by or against individual
members of the class.' This same purpose provides the basis for a
(b) (3) type of class action.
Paragraph (b) (3) is by far the most drastic innovation of the
amended Rule. It is quite different from its supposed counterpart in
the prior Rule, the "spurious" class provision.' Whereas a decision
under (b) (3) is binding on all members of the class who do not spe-
cifically exclude themselves, the spurious class was merely a permissive
joinder device binding only those persons who actually intervened in
the action.' The change in the binding nature of this type of class action
2 Examples of the first type of (b) (1) class actions include actions against a munici-
pality to declare a bond issue invalid or limit it, or to prevent or limit the making of . a
particular appropriation. An example of the second type of (b) (1) class action is an action
brought by a single policy holder against a fraternal benefit association attacking a
financial reorganization of the society. Ilere, indeed, it would be impossible to confine
the effects of the attack to the individual plaintiffs. For additional examples, see Advisory
Committee's Note to Amended Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 100 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at —I.
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2).
4 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102. Subdivision (b) (2) is certainly not limited to
civil rights cases, however, and may include any action looking to final injunctive or
declaratory relief. The Advisory Committee specifies that (b) (2) could be utilized in the
antitrust area either to enjoin or to test the legality of price discrimination practices or
tying arrangements. Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102.
5 Id. at 100.
6 The "spurious" category of class actions included actions in which the character
of the right sought to be enforced was "several, and [in which] there [was] a common
question of law or fact affecting the several rights and [in which] a common relief
[was] sought." The category was labeled "spurious" by Professor Moore, architect of
the former Rule 23. See J. Moore, Federal Rules 551; Moore & Cohn, Federal Class
Actions, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 307 (1937).
7 See Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the
Preliminary Draft, 25 Geo. W. 551, 570-76 (1937); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d
319 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944).
516
THE DEFENDANT'S VIEW
will most definitely increase the number of class members who partici-
pate in a given action. Since the spurious class was the primary ve-
hicle for instituting damage actions under the old Rule, only the injured
members who intervened were permitted to recover. Consequently, such
classes were quite small, being limited only to those who could afford
the litigation. By providing that these actions are now binding on all
injured parties, paragraph (b) (3) opens the door to monetary judg-
ments of astronomical size. The amended Rule thus represents a sub-
stantial change from prior law and a substantial danger to any party
opposing a class.
An example of the extremes to which such alleged classes can
reach is the case of Eisen v. Carlisle & acquelin,s recently decided
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In that case the in-
dividual plaintiff sought damages from the defendants for himself and
all other purchasers and sellers of "odd-lot" securities. Approximately
3,750,000 individual and corporate buyers and sellers were included in
the class. The district court ruled that the action could not be brought
as a class action.° The court of appeals, however, in a two-to-one
decision, reversed the action of the trial court and remanded the case
for further consideration of the issue whether the action was properly
a class action.'°
If an individual plaintiff seeking damages can now, sua sponte,
bring into a district court 3,750,000 plaintiffs who have Made no claim
and who do not intend to do so, section (b) (3) demands special scru-
tiny in order to determine the true scope of the amended Rule.
II. THE BASIC PURPOSE OF SUBDIVISION (b)(3)
All three types of class actions are designed to be optional tools
which the court should employ, within the discretion granted to it, to
reduce the burdensome impact of multiple litigation. Because the
(b) (3) type of class action is the most drastic innovation of the new
Rule, its purposes and scope will receive primary attention.
The Supreme Court's Advisory Committee clearly delineates the
policy of (b) (3).
Subdivision (b) (3) encompasses those cases in which a class
action would achieve economies of time, effort and expense,
and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly
situated . .11
In explanation of the (b) (3) requirement that the "common" class
questions "predominate" over the solely individual questions, the Ad-
8 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir, 1968).
° Id.
10 Id.
11 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 103.
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visory Committee states that "[i] t is only where this predominance
exists that economies can be achieved by the class action device.'
(Emphasis added.) Thus, according to the Advisory Committee,
(b) (3) is a device for consolidating numerous existing claims to one
forum in order to prevent repetitious litigation and "achieve economies
of time, effort and expense."
Many courts seem to be disregarding this explicit purpose for the
(b) (3) action." These courts assert that Rule 23 was amended to pro-
vide a means by which small claimants who are unable to afford in-
dividual adjudication of their common injuries may obtain judicial
relief. It is argued that the change in the binding judgment provisions
from the spurious type to that in the (b) (3) type was intended to
enable the inclusion of these small claimants in the judgment and in
the corresponding relief." Indeed, there has been some discussion in
the past about such a humanitarian purpose within the class action,"
but this purpose is enunciated nowhere in Rule 23. Furthermore, in
practice such a principle—if embodied within (b)(3)—would produce
a direct conflict with the professed purpose of economy of time, ex-
pense and effort." To date, three courts of appeal have reversed dis-
missals of alleged class actions under the new Rule and maintained
that dismissal would deprive the small claimant of a forum for relief."
These courts either ignored the economy principle of the new Rule,
or gave it only token recognition. An analysis of the Rule makes clear,
however, that the (b) (3) class action device should not be employed,
regardless of incidental salutary purposes, unless the basic goal of
efficiency is achieved through the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation.
A. Prerequisites and the Economy Purpose
The prerequisites to the class action enumerated in subsection
(a) anticipate, on their face, a situation where multiple litigation is
either existing or imminent. These prerequisites are as follows:
12 Id.
13 Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir, 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1194 (1969);
Hohmann v. Packard Instruments Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
14 See statement by Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter for the Rules Committee, cited in
Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From A Judge's Point of View, 32 Antitrust L.J. 295, 299
(1966).
15 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 14, at 298-300; Kalven 	 Rosenfield, supra note 1,
at 717; Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 Buffalo L.
Rev. 433, 435 (1960).
16 There certainly can be no economy in inviting parties into the action who had
no intention whatsoever of asserting their claims. Such a practice can only prolong the
trial and create added expense, and thus conflicts with the basic philosophy of the (b) (3)
class action.
17 Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1194
(1969) ; Hohmann v. Packard Instruments Co., 399 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1968) ; Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968).
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(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members
of a class may sue or be sued as repre .sentative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 18
Subdivision (a) (I) speaks of the possibility of joinder, and raises
the question whether joinder can be applied to non-litigants. Under
subdivision (a)(2), how can a court determine whether there are
"questions of law or fact" common to a group which includes litigants
and non-litigants? Finally, under (a) (3) and (a) (4), do the "in-
terests" of a non-litigant require protection by the representative
party? The answers to these questions are negative. The wording of
the prerequisites evidences the draftsmen's obvious intent that the class
action be used to solve the problems inherent in multiple litigation.
B. Requirements of (b)(3) and the Economy Purpose
If the four initial prerequisites are met, the court is then obligated
to determine under subsection (b)
(3) ... that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy." (Emphasis added.)
In the absence of an affirmative finding on both requirements, no
(b) (3) class action can be maintained. The Rule sets forth criteria
pertinent to these findings:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B)
the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con-
troversy already commenced by or against members of the
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action."
Again, an analysis of the individual topics indicates that multi-
plicity of litigation and potential economies are the primary matters of
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
19 Id. at 23(b) (3).
20 Id,
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concern for the trial court. The "interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions"
is meaningless unless separate actions have been commenced, or are
about to be commenced. The "extent and nature" of other litigation
concerning the controversy also makes the existence of other litigation
a major element of the necessary findings. The "desirability or unde-
sirability of concentrating the litigation" of claims in the particular
forum anticipates a circumstance of actual or threatened multiple liti-
gation. Finally, "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the manage-
ment of a class action" must be of prime concern to the court, par-
ticularly when one of the benefits to be achieved by a (b) (3) class
action is the economy which such actions supposedly can achieve in the
administration of justice.
Yet, as previously noted, three courts of appeal have ignored the
basic purpose of Rule 23 as amended and permitted class actions to
proceed in order to provide a forum for the small claimant. While it is
true that a (b) (3) class action can provide a forum for the small
claimant, this result is at most an incidental benefit of the use of the
class action device to resolve in one case what otherwise would be a
number of actions. The courts in the latter three cases have turned
this incidental benefit into the basic justification for the maintenance
of such actions.
This approach has not escaped criticism. Chief Judge Lumbard,
dissenting from the majority in Eisen, noted that the amount expended
in filing and processing claims in that case would probably exceed any
recovery even if all the difficulties inherent in the administration of
the suit were overcome.' He pointed out that Rule 23 did not intend
that courts should hear causes of action as class actions merely because
they would otherwise not hear them at al1.22 Judge Lumbard further
noted that the subject matter of the action was within the jurisdiction
of the Securities and Exchange Commission and should be resolved by
that agency. He urged that the trial court be affirmed to "put an end
to this Frankenstein monster posing as a class action." 22
A class action of the (b) (3) type, under appropriate circum-
stances, can achieve economies in the administration of the court sys-
tem and in the enforcement of numerous claims. However, an injudi-
cious and indiscriminate utilization of the class action device can result
in a perversion of this policy and can lead to a crushing burden on the
court system by creation of massive, unmanageable litigation. Before
the new Rule can achieve its intended economies, the courts must con-
sciously resolve the conflict between two competing considerations: the
21 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968).
22 Id. at 572.
23 Id .
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availability of a forum for the small claimant; and the elimination of
time, effort and expense likely to result from the indiscriminate use of
the (b) (3) class action device.
III. EFFECTS OF INDISCRIMINATE
UTILIZATION OF (b) (3) CLASS ACTIONS
There are three obvious undesirable results of the indiscriminate
approval of (b) (3) class actions: (1) the use of the class action device
for the solicitation of claims; (2) the economic impact on defendants
in these cases; and (3) the crushing economic and administrative bur-
den imposed upon the courts,
Even under Rule 23 prior to amendment, the class action device
was peculiarly susceptible to the solicitation of litigants by attorneys
who were anxious to seek out additional members of the alleged class to
join as party plaintiffs. It was recognized that activities in connection
therewith might well be a violation of Canon 28 of the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics,' which prohibits the stirring up of litigation.' The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that it is reluctant to
permit actions to proceed where they are not likely to benefit anyone
but the lawyers who bring them.' It has also been recognized that the
class action device may be a method of creating law suits where none
previously existed. 2'
Under the new Rule no notice is to be given to a class until after
determination that a class suit should proceed. The Advisory Commit-
tee's Note states that notice to alleged class members is available
fundamentally for the protection of the members of the class and
should not be used as a device for the undesirable solicitation of
claims.28 However, the notification of the class members has as its very
basis for existence the bringing into court of a multitude of additional
claimants or litigants.
It is conceivable that if multiple litigation has resulted from a
set of circumstances, or is threatened, the class action device and the
corresponding notice requirement can be utilized to effect economies
in the disposition of the litigation by joining all litigants in one action.
However, in the absence of such an indication, the solicitation feature
of the notice seems all too apparent. If no substantial sentiment to
make claims exists among members of the alleged class, the notice
24 Cherner v. Transition Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934, 936 (D. Mass. 1962),
25 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 28.
28 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 567 (2d Cir. 1968).
27 Berley v. Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D. 397, 398-99 '(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
28 39 F.R.D. at 107. In this regard, the Advisory Note refers to the discussions in
Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962) ; Hormel v.
United States, 17 F.R.D. 303 (S.DN.Y. 1955).
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provision of Rule 23 provides a judicially approved method for the
unlawful solicitation of clients.
A second undesirable result of the indiscriminate use of (b)(3)
class actions is the economic impact which such actions can impose
upon defendants. Prior to the determination of the class issue, the
defendant does not know if the plaintiff represents himself, or a group
of persons whose alleged combined loss would be of such magnitude
that the very economic life of a defendant would be in jeopardy.
The vast amounts frequently claimed by the representative party
in a typical class suit require that the very utmost in legal time and
energy be expended in defense even if the defendants are completely
innocent of any wrongdoing. The economic impact upon defendants in
such a circumstance can be grave. When the stakes are so large, mas-
sive trial preparation must be undertaken with its corresponding ex-
pense,^regardless of the innocence of the defendants.
Even after a determination of the class issue, great uncertainty
exists as to the number of persons who will actually come forward and
prove their claims. For this reason, any compromise settlement becomes
exceptionally difficult. For example, if settlement is approached on a
"nuisance" basis, counsel find it difficult to calculate the potential dam-
ages because of the many variables concerning the size of the class and
persons who will actually pursue their claims.
On the other hand, the aggregate amounts claimed in some alleged
class actions are of such magnitude that defendants must often accede
to some settlement, regardless of the merits of the claim, and regardless
of the difficulties in effecting such a settlement. The economic threat
arising from the very pendency of such an action seriously impedes
any financial planning by a defendant company. The credit status of
an economically sound corporation can be critically affected by the
mere existence of such an action. Such vast power to impede the effi-
cient functioning of a business organization is granted under the new
Rule to any lawyer filing an alleged class action.
The third undesirable effect of the indiscriminate approval of
(b) (3) class actions is the considerable and often massive burden im-
posed upon the courts. The order declaring that an action can proceed
as a class action instantaneously authorizes an action with hundreds,
thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of parties.
Paragraph (c) (2) of Rule 23, as amended, provides that "the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort. 723 In a class action in which
the alleged class consists of thousands or tens of thousands of people,
the burden upon the court in preparing and mailing such notice, re-
20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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sponding to inquiries, and tabulating returns could far exceed the
budget of any district court.
In addition, paragraph (d) (2) sets forth circumstances in which
additional notices to all class members may be required. Such notices
can relate (1) to any step in the action, (2) to the proposed extent of
the judgment, (3) to the opportunities of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, or (4) to the re-
quirements of a party who wishes to intervene and present claims or
defenses, or otherwise come into the action.' It is likely that several
notices to the class will be required in any class action.
An even larger burden is assumed with reference to the assessment
of damages. If the issue of liability is resolved in favor of the class,
the court must establish damages for each member of the class. The
defendant certainly has a right to trial by jury as to this essential
element of the claim. For example, in an action alleging a violation of
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the individual
plaintiff must prove the details of the purchase and sale of shares, and
especially of his individual reliance upon the alleged misrepresenta-
tion." Such evidence as he offers on these points is, of course, subject
to cross-examination and counter-testimony.
The possibility of hearing testimony from thousands of individuals
regarding their damages should certainly be a serious consideration
for the court before the determination that any action can proceed as
a class action. It has already been pointed out in the Eisen case that
the amount expended in filing and processing claims by 3,750,000
plaintiffs would probably exceed any recovery32
In one class action, the court and counsel consumed over three
years in the attempt to resolve questions relating to the identification of
members of the class, the determination of the amount of the total
award, and the resolution of other residual and post-judgment prob-
lems." Finally, a compromise settlement was made because of the
inability of the court and counsel to resolve these problems to any
definite degree. 34 This case was brought under Rule 23 prior to amend-
ment, when such actions bound only those persons who intervened or
who were parties to the suit. Under the new Rule 23, the problems
to be resolved will certainly be multiplied.
The vast burden which is imposed upon the courts in many class
3° Id. at 23(d) (2).
31 Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634
(7th Cir. 1963).
391 F.R.D. 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
33 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. l'slisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962), petition
for cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1963).
84 See reference to the Union, Carbide case in Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 73 n.5
(D. Utah 1966).
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actions seems of secondary import, however, when it is considered that
according to the Advisory Committee the primary purpose of the action
is to achieve "economies of time, effort and expense. . 2'35
IV. THE DISCRETION GRANTED BY THE
AMENDED RULE TO THE TRIAL COURT
The draftsmen of the amended Rule apparently realized that
problems of application would arise. With this in mind, they armed the
trial judge with considerable discretionary powers to fit the Rule to the
given situation.' Indeed, one of the principal features of Rule 23, as
amended, is the broad discretion granted to the trial court to determine
whether specific litigation should be permitted to proceed as a class
action. The Advisory Committee's Note states that in situations under
subdivision (b) (3), class action treatment is not as clearly called for
as in the (b) (1) and (b) (2) types of actions but "may nevertheless be
convenient and desirable depending upon the particular facts." 37 (Em-
phasis added.)
Regarding the issue of discretion, Professor Cohn has recently
commented:
As with joinder of parties under rule 19, the district judge,
unhampered by traditional classifications, is given a large
measure of discretion in balancing conflicting interests. Al-
though it has been suggested that the court hearing a class
action is in a poor position to determine fairness and ad-
equacy of representation, the amended rule adopts the posi-
tion of the many authorities that trust the ability of the trial
court to decide these issues when aided by a procedure that
contains a built-in flexibility." (Emphasis added.)
Too few cases have as yet been decided by the courts of appeal
to determine whether the discretion lodged in the trial court under the
new Rule will be respected at the appellate level. However, in three re-
cent cases the courts of appeal have reversed trial court holdings that
the litigation was not suitable for class action treatment without con-
sidering the discretion issue."
The practical effect of such rulings will be to eliminate the exercise
35 39 F.R.D. at 102.
38 See Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of Class Actions: A Consideration of Sub-
division (d), 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 577 (1969).
37 Id.
38 Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 Geo. L.J. 1204, 1214
(1966). In this regard, Mr. Cohn also refers to 2 W. Barron & A. Elolizoff, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure § 572, at 351-52' (Rules ed. 1961); Z. Chafee, supra note 1, at 288-95.
39 Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1194
(1969) ; Hohmann v. Packard Instruments Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968); Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
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of discretion by trial judges through utter intimidation, and thereby to
frustrate the fundamental flexibility of the amended Rule. The mere
allegation of class representation will then be sufficient to satisfy the
standard and thus to burden the court systems with unlimited claims.
It is ironic that the courts of appeal have chosen to disregard the
issue of discretion in view of Mr. Justice Black's dissent to the
amended Rules. The thrust of Justice Black's criticism of the new
Rules, and especially of Rule 23, was that they conferred excessive
discretion upon the trial judge.
It seems to me that they place too much power in the hands
of the trial judges and that the rules might almost as well
simply provide that "class suits can be maintained either for
or against groups whenever in the discretion of a judge he
thinks it is wise."'
In the final analysis, it seems that Mr. Justice Black's fears were
groundless. But•such is the case only because the courts of appeal
have chosen to disregard the will of the majority of the Advisory Com-
mittee and to deprive the trial judge of the wide discretion that was
accorded him by the amended Rule.
It is likely that further experience with Rule 23 will substantiate
the wisdom of entrusting this discretion to the trial court which is
best situated to determine, from all the facts and circumstances and
under the guidelines of the new Rule, whether use of the class action
device is desirable in a given case. Consistent reversal by the courts
of appeal of trial court findings would vitiate this most important
principle of the new Rule and thus undermine its essential flexibility.
V. CONCLUSION
The (b) (3) class action created by Rule 23, as amended, repre-
sents a drastic change in federal procedural law, having only a remote
connection with the traditional class actions or the old spurious class
action. It provides a new device for bringing before the court great
numbers of passive litigants who would otherwise have remained
silent. Unless restricted to those cases where, in the discretion of the
trial judge, such actions can achieve economies of time, effort and
expense, class actions will become "Frankenstein monsters," disrupting
the administration of the judicial system.
The theory that such class actions can provide a forum for the
small claimant frequently conflicts with the basic purpose of the Rule:
the achievement of economies of time, effort and expense. The constant
threat of solicitation in each of these cases should be considered care-
fully before they are authorized to proceed as class actions.
40 See Mr. Justice Black's Statement, 39 F.R.D. 272, 274 (1966).
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In the final analysis, the broad discretion granted by the
amended Rule to the trial judge for determining the class issue should
be accorded great weight by the courts of appeal reviewing such
orders. The discretion traditionally granted to United States district
judges in many areas of the law has been wisely exercised, and
rarely impinged upon by the courts of review. The effective utilization
of the class action device will depend upon a realistic recognition of
this discretion as it is exercised for the purposes consistent with the
basic policy objectives of Rule 23.
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